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Notes
It's Time to Create a Bay Area Regional
Government
by
KENNETH A. BRTNETTI*
The San Francisco Bay Area is comprised of nine counties' with
a land area of 6957 square miles.2 More than six million people live in
this region and are governed by nnety-eight mumcipalities4 and dozens
of large special districts. 5 Each of these counties, municipalities, and
special districts has its own system of government, resulting in a bal-
kanization of government authority that impedes the ability to solve
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1986, University of Pennsylvania. The author would
like to thank Kathy Pagan for her support.
1. The nine counties that uniformly are recognized as part of the Bay Area are Alameda,
Contra Costa, Mann, Napa, San Mateo, San Francisco, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma. E.g.,
J. Bou.icNs, Tan PROBLEM OF GoVERNENr TH SAN FRANcIsco BAY REGION ii-iv (1948) ("The
concept of a nine-county region is accepted to a marked extent m the official and unofficial
literature concerning local government m California.").
Stanislaus County, which is located east of Santa Clara County, recently has indicated that it
would like to join the traditional nine Bay Area counties in attempting to solve regional problems
related to growth. Stanislaus County Says It Might as Well Join Bay Area, San Francisco Chron.,
Feb. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
2. Each of the nine Bay Area counties has the following land area in square miles: San
Francisco, 46; San Mateo, 447; Santa Clara, 1293; Solano, 834; Sonoma, 1604; Mann, 523;
Napa, 744; Alameda, 736; and Contra Costa, 730. Tan WOLD ALmANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS
573 (1989).
3. The population of the nine-county region according to early 1990 census figures is
6,023,577. Census Confirms Huge Jump in State Population, San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 26,
1991, at Al, col. 5. This ranks the Bay Area as the fourth largest metropolitan area in the
United States. Bay Area to Top 6 Million During 1990, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 14, 1990,
at A2, col 5. The top three American metropolitan areas are New York, with 18.1 million people,
Los Angeles, with 13.7 million people, and Chicago, with 8.1 million people.
4. Growth: A Chance to Recapture Planning Leadership, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 26,
1989, at B2, col. 1; Bay Area's Rough Road to Regional Government, San Francisco Chron.,
Oct. 23, 1989, at A4, col. 1.
5. "Special Districts are defed as legally constituted governmental entities that are
neither cities, counties or school districts. Special Districts have substantially the same general
governmental powers as those shared by most other local governments under the State Constitution
and State Statutes." 1986-1987 CAL. STATE CoiNTRoLLER ANN. REPORT, FNANcriL T4NsAcrIoNs
CoNcmunuo SpicrAL DismicTs OF CAL. 1-6 to -7 (1987).
For examples of special districts in the Bay Area, see infra notes 13, 16.
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urban problems impacting the entire region. Modern urban problems
are common to everyone who lives in the Bay Area. Examples include
traffic, ineffective public transportation, growing mounds of garbage
with decreasing availability of dump sights, air and water pollution, a
lack of affordable housing, and a decreasing amount of open space. 6
In an attempt to address some of these problems, Bay Area rep-
resentatives formed Bay Vision 2020 on December 14, 1989. 7 Bay Vision
2020 (the Commission) is a coalition of business, environmental, and
local community leaders who were appointed by Bay Area political lead-
ers." The Commission was given one year to study the urban problems
facing the Bay Area, create a general vision for future development of
the region, and recommend specific actions to address the problems. 9
Because the Commission recognizes that no single present authority ad-
equately can address problems that cross municipal and county borders,
one of its goals was to examine the feasibility of creating a form of
regional government. In its draft report, Bay Vision 2020 recommends
that a temporary regional commission be created by merging several of
the Bay Area's present single purpose agencies. The new regional com-
mission would then have four years to prepare a Bay Area regional plan
and design a permanent regional agency that could carry out the plan. 0
The idea of regional government is not new to the Bay Area; the
area has a long history of attempts to create a regional authority." De-
spite the enthusiasm of their proponents, however, these attempts have
failed, largely because of political obstacles.
Ira Heyman, former Chancellor at the University of California,
Berkeley and Chairman of Bay Vision 2020, was an active proponent
of forming a Bay Area regional government more than twenty years
6. See Growth: A Chance to Recapture Planning Leadership, San Francisco Chron., Oct.
26, 1989, at B2, col. 1.
7. New Board for Bay Area to Seek Regional Answers, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 15,
1989, at Al, col. 1.
8. The committee that appointed all 30 Commission members was composed of Santa
Clara County Supervisor Ron Diridon, Oakland Mayor Lionel Wilson, Bay Area Air Quality
Management District Chairwoman Shirley Campbell, Mill Valley City Councilwoman Kathleen
Foote, San Mateo Supervisor Mary Griffin, and Association of Bay Area Governments President
Warren Hopkins. Id.
9. Id. The Commission was faced with a difficult task in overcoming the "endless bickering
between municipal and county politicians that has prevented the creation of a single plan for
Bay Area growth." Id. The Commission, however, "has the collective weight to make waves,
with members from key regional business, environmental and nonprofit organizations." Id.
10. Bay Vision 2020 Review Draft Report 14-18, Jan. 1991. The report recommends the
merger initially of three agencies: the Bay Area Air Quality Management District, the Metropolitan
Transportation Commission, and the voluntary agency, the Association of Bay Area Governments.
Other agencies might be merged with the new super agency in the future. Id. at 14; see also
New Commission on Bay Area Future, San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 15, 1989, at A4, col. 1.
11. See infra Part IA.
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ago. In 1967, Heyman wrote that "a more formal metropolitan gov-
ernment is necessary for solving the more complicated problems
in the San Francisco Bay Area.' ' 2 Heyman noted that problems af-
flicting the Bay Area such as transportation, pollution, and waste dis-
posal could not be solved by the single purpose special agencies that
existed at the time.' 3 Instead, Heyman said that these problems "require
treatment of the metropolitan area as an entity in order to maximize
coordination, minimize municipal competition, and equalize financial
capacities. Such treatment is possible only through a powerful regional
government.' ' 4 Despite a population increase of 1.39 million people
since 1970,' 5 the creation of a plethora of new agencies,' 6 and persistent
problems of urban sprawl, 7 no form of regional government exists to-
day in the Bay Area.
12. Heyman, Symposium: The San Francisco Bay Area-Regional Problems and Solutions,
55 CAU:. L. Ray. 695, 698 (1967).
13. Id. at 697-98. Heyman noted for example that there were "at least five separate and
often warrng" transportation agencies m the Bay Area. Id. By 1989, the Bay Area had as many
as 23 transportation agencies, all of winch compete for common state and federal transportation
funds and many of wich compete for passengers. See Regional Transit Service Consolidation:
Interim Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Transportation, State of Califorma, Dec. 16,
1988, at 2 [hereinafter Regional Transit Service Consolidation Hearing] (proposed California
Senate bill to consolidate Bay Area transportation districts). The San Francisco Chronicle reported
that as many as 28 separate transit agencies exist in the Bay Area. Bay Transit Federation
Proposed, San Francisco Chron., June 14, 1990, at Al, col.l.
Examples of special districts m the Bay Area mentioned by Heyman include the Bay Area
Rapid Transit District (BART), AC Transit, which deals with public transportation in Alameda
and Contra Costa Counties, the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission
(BCDC), the Bay Area Air Pollution and Control Board, the Regional Water Quality Control
Board, the East Bay Mumcipal Utilities District (EBMUD), and the East Bay Regional Park
District. Heyman, supra note 12, at 697-98.
14. Heyman, supra note 12, at 699.
15. The population of the nine-county region in 1970 was 4.63 million (discounting Santa
Cruz). BuREAu oF Tm Coesus, U.S. DEPT. OF Com., STATISTICAL ABsmAEcT oF rH UN=TE
STATEs (1989) [hereinafter STATItrIcAL Awsn~cT]. This figure is based on the general concept
of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), wich is defined as "a large population nucleus together
with adjacent communities wich have a high degree of social and economic integration with
that nucleus." Id. at 3. The Bay Area is defined as a consolidated metropolitan statistical area
(CMSA), the largest type of MSA unit and one that is reserved for "large metropolitan
complexes." Id. Although Santa Cruz is considered part of the Bay Area CMSA, its population
has been deleted from this figure because it is not part of the traditional mne-county region. See
supra note 1.
The 1990 population for the nime-county region was 6,023,577, a net increase of 1.39 million.
See supra note 3.
16. The number of transportation districts in the Bay Area increased from five in 1967 to
between 17 and 23, depending upon which figures are used, in 1989. See Regional Transit Service
Consolidation Hearing, supra note 13. In addition to transit districts, the following special
agencies were created since 1967: BCDC, 1969 Cal. Stat. 1400-01 (codified at CAL GOV'T. CODE
§ 66620 (West 1983)); and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), 1970 Cal. Stat.
1624-28 (codified at CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 66500-66522 (West 1983)).
17. Urban sprawl generally is defined as uncontrolled urban growth and the resulting
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The purpose of this Note is to examine the implications of creating
a regional form of government for the Bay Area. After exploring the
various forms of limited regional government that exist in cities such
as Toronto and Minneapolis-St. Paul,18 this Note argues that a limited
form of regional government for the Bay Area not only could be suc-
cessful, but is required to solve any of the problems associated with
urban sprawl.
Past efforts to create some form of regional government have failed
due to political reasons. Despite its value, a regional government re-
mains very unpopular to the general public and to existing munici-
palities. Regional government too often is viewed as another layer of
bureaucracy that will require additional tax revenues. 19 Further, mu-
nicipalities and existing agencies regard regional government as a threat
to their very existence? ° These short-sighted viewpoints fall to recognize
the significant advantages regional government has for a large met-
ropolitan area such as the Bay Area.
The only way to circumvent these political hurdles is for the Cal-
ifornia Legislature to take strong, decisive action in creating a limited
but effective form of regional government. This is not an issue that
should be voted on by the general public. History in the Bay Area, 21
as well as in other states,2 demonstrates that if such an issue were put
to a vote, it would have virtually no chance of passing.
"unhappy consequences," including dissipation of open space, unnecessarily high costs for the
extension of services and utilities, wasteful use of land, air pollution, and total reliance on the
automobile without adequate provision of public transportation facilities. See STAFOR ENvI-
RoNmENTAL LAW SOC'Y, A HAmBOOK FOR CONTROLLING LOCAL GROWTH 1 (1973).
18. See infra notes 175-225 and accompanying text.
19. See New Regional Panel Told Its Task Is a Tough One, San Francisco Chron., Jan.
30, 1990, at A3, col. 1.
20. Id.; see also Bruzzone, De-Romanticizing Bay Area Regionalism, San Francisco Chron.,
Feb. 15, 1990, at A29, col. 5 (criticizing regional government and mandatory regional planning
and asserting that polls indicate the majority of Bay Area residents oppose regional authority
over local decisions such as growth, land use, and housing development).
21. Several attempts at creating a regional form of government in the Bay Area were defeated
by popular vote. See infra notes 29-50 and accompanying text.
BART was approved by a narrow margin in 1962, after the California Legislature reduced the
voter approval requirement to 60% rather than the traditional two-thirds approval required in
bond elections. The voters of the three-county district (Alameda, Contra Costa, and San Francisco
counties) approved BART by 61.22%, although BART actually was defeated in Contra Costa
County. R. GREFE & R. SMART, A HISTORY OF THE KEY DECISIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAY
AREA RAPI TRANsrr (BART) 56-59 (prepared by McDonald & Smart, Inc. for the U.S.
Department of Transportation and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Sept.
1975, Doc. No. FR 3-14-75, revised by the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, Mar. 1976)
[hereinafter KEY DEcIsIoNs].
22. See J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, Expsumsesr IN MEROPOLITAN GoVERNmENT xiv-xviii
(1977); M. MoGUlOF, Fwa METROPOLITAN GovmsEsNTs 125-31 (1972).
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Any legislative attempt to create a regional government will face
a legal challenge under the home rule clause of the California Con-
stitution.23 The home rule doctrine preserves the right to self-deter-
mination for cities, 24 thereby granting cities freedom from state
interference with regard to matters of "local concern". 2 Local matters
include, for example, maintenance of streets, sidewalks, and parks; pro-
vision of police and fire departments; and local zoning laws.26 Issues
having an effect outside the borders of a city, however, are considered
matters of "general" or "statewide" concern and are controlled by state
law.27 Thus, a regional government should survive a home rule challenge
as long as it concentrates on issues that are truly regional in scope and
does not attempt to expropriate from cities and counties the power to
rule on local matters.2
Part I of this Note describes the background of the Bay Area's past
efforts to create a regional government. Part I also explores the urban
problems facing the Bay Area, which arguably can be addressed ef-
fectively only by a regional form of government. Part II examines the
various types of regional governments developed in other cities and sug-
gests which form is most suitable for the Bay Area. Part III of this Note
addresses the inevitable legal challenge that a regional government will
face. Specifically, it analyzes how such a government can survive a chal-
lenge under the municipal home rule section of the California Con-
stitution.
I. The Bay Area Region
To fully appreciate the need for a regional government in the Bay
Area, it is important not only to understand the problems that plague
the area today, but also to understand the problems that existed when
past efforts were made to create a regional government. As these efforts
failed and the region further developed, the urban problems facing the
region intensified.
23. See CAL. CONSr. art. XI, §§ 1-3, 5, 7-8, 11; see also 8 B. WrrW, SUMMARY OF
CAnwomu LAW § 799 (1988) (explaining doctrine of municipal home rule).
24. B. WmaN, supra note 23, § 799. Counties also are given limited home rule protection
under the California Constitution. See CAL. CONSr. art. XI, §§ 1, 3-4. The protection of cities
under home rule, however, is stronger than that of counties. See id. § 5(a). Cities, unlike
counties, have "municipal affairs" protection. For a discussion of municipal affairs, see infra
text accompanying notes 240-247.
25. B. WrrxjN supra note 23, § 799.
26. See id. §§ 799-803; see also infra note 272 and accompanying text (zoning traditionally
has been considered a local matter).
27. B. Wrrrm, supra note 23, § 800.
28. See infra Part III.
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A. Past Efforts At Creating a Regional Government in the Bay Area
(1) Alameda County
Efforts at creating a regional government began as early as 1916
in the East Bay. The City and County Government Association, an
organization created by the Tax Association of Alameda County, pro-
posed that all of the cities of Alameda County be combined as boroughs
into one large city.2 9 The borough governments were to retain local pow-
ers such as maintenance of local police and fire departments, main-
tenance of streets and subsidiary sewer lines, and the power to make
local ordinances. 30 Powers not given to the boroughs were to remain
with the city-county government1.3 Proponents believed that a consol-
idated government would be more efficient than ten separate munici-
palities and more effectively could address problems facing the growing
region. 32 Opponents of the plan, however, claimed that a new, all-pow-
erful government would destroy the autonomy of their cities and even
labeled it "un-American. ' ' 33 Each of the major newspapers in Oakland
and Berkeley also strongly opposed the plan.M The proposal lost by a
three-to-two vote of the Alameda County electorate in November 1921 .3
(2) San Francisco-San Mateo
While the East Bay was losing out in its quest for a regional gov-
ernment, another side of the Bay was experiencing a similar develop-
ment. The population in San Francisco had swelled to 506,676 in 1920
and the city was rich with industry,3 7 but the area was confined to only
forty-two square miles. 38 With ample undeveloped land, 39 San Mateo
29. J. BouxNs, supra note 1, at 65-66.
30. Id. at 66.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 67.
33. Id. at 68.
34. Id. at 67.
35. Id. at 69.
36. DEPARTKEnr OF ComMERcE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FouRTmsnr CENSUS OF THE
UNrrED STATES, 3 POPULATMON 127 (1922) [hereinafter FoURiHETMH CENSUS].
37. J. BoU.ENs, supra note 1, at 71.
38. FOURTEENTH CENSUS, supra note 36, at 95. The current land area of San Francisco is
46 square miles. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOoK OF FACTs 573 (1989). This difference can be
attributed to landfill in San Francisco Bay, which has increased the land area of the City. For
a thorough discussion of bay fill in San Francisco, see G. Dow, BAY FILL IN SAN FRANCISCO:
A HISTORY OF CHANGE (1973).
39. See J. Bou.ENS, supra note 1, at 71. The land area of San Mateo County in 1920 was
447 square miles. FoURTEENTH CENSUS, supra note 36, at 96.
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County had the opposite problem: its small municipalities were unable
to provide adequate services for their populations. 40 San Francisco needed
space to continue growing; San Mateo needed improved municipal serv-
ices. Some political leaders saw an ideal match.
Numerous proposals were brought forward for consolidating all
or part of San Mateo County with the City and County of San Fran-
cisco. 41 The peak of this activity occurred between 1928 and 1932.42 One
of the plans envisioned unified transportation system, including rapid
transit, which would allow people to reside in San Mateo and commute
to -work into San Francisco.43 San Francisco would be able to provide
the necessary water, power, industrial, and port development re-
sources. 44
An extensive study completed by the San Francisco Bureau of Gov-
ernment Research provided the arguments for a more efficient gov-
ernment and for better and cheaper services for the residents of San
Mateo County.4 Most San Mateo residents, however, opposed con-
solidation.46 One commentator noted that the arguments against con-
solidation were largely emotional, based on the fear that San Mateo
would lose its autonomy to San Francisco. 47 The vote for consolidation
never reached the polls. Instead, San Mateo voted itself a new county
charter, effectively killing any hope for consolidation. 4" A few more
attempts at consolidation were made during the mid-forties, but each
time the issue came up, opposition formed and the idea again was
shelved. 49 Although San Francisco supported the idea of consolidation,
it could never overcome the political opposition generated in San Mateo
County."
(3) Bay Area Rapid Transit District
The next major attempt to create a regional agency in the Bay Area
began when the California Legislature passed the San Francisco Bay
40. J. Bou.ENs, supra note 1, at 71.
41. Id. at 70-94.
42. Id. at 82-92.
43. Id. at 74, 76.
44. Id. at 74-77.
45. Id. at 77-82.
46. Id. at 91-92.
47. Id. at 92.
48. Id. at 89.
49. Id. at 92-94.
50. Id. at 94. There is no way of knowing whether such a proposal would succeed today,
but after the growth of the past few decades such a merger would do little to address the region's
problems.
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Area Metropolitan Rapid Transit District Act in 1949.51 This act pro-
vided the legal framework for developing a transit system traversing the
entire nine-county Bay Area. In 1951 a Bay Area Rapid Transit Com-
mission (BART Commission) was formed to begin planning a rail sys-
tem.52 After studying the transportation situation for several years, the
BART Commission released a preliminary report recommending de-
velopment of a rapid transit system that would include all nine counties. 3
The BART Commission then hired a New York engineering firm
to design a complete Bay Area transit system. In 1956 the BART Com-
mission released the engineering report, recommending a rapid transit
system that ultimately would circumnavigate San Francisco Bay and
reach all nine counties 4 The system was to be built in three separate
stages; the first stage was to include construction in San Francisco, San
Mateo, Matin, and parts of Alameda and Contra Costa counties. 5 One
member of the BART Commission, Marvin Lewis, said that creation
of a borough system of government for the entire Bay Area would be
studied as one way to successfully implement the new transit system.16
Although Lewis did not specify how such a borough system would op-
erate in the Bay Area, he noted that "[e]veryone agrees we need some
sort of regional organization to handle our regional problems. ' '57
After reviewing this report the California Legislature quickly passed
a bill creating the Bay Area Rapid Transit District, which included San
Francisco, Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, and San Mateo counties,
and providing that Santa Clara, Napa, Solano, and Sonoma counties
would join later.58 The bill allowed a county to withdraw from the sys-
tem by a vote of its board of supervisors. 9 This procedural provision
51. San Francisco Bay Area Metropolitan Rapid Transit District Act, 1949 Cal. Stat. 2173.
52. San Francisco Bay Area Metropolitan Rapid Transit District Act, 1951 Cal. Stat. 4187.
53. Griffith & Holmes, BART and the Victoria Line: A Comparison of New Commuter
Transport in California and London, 55 CALiF. L. Rnv. 780, 784-86 (1967).
54. SF-Oakland Tube Key to Six-County Plan, Urged as Bar to Traffic Strangulation, San
Francisco Chron., Jan. 6, 1956, at 1, col. 1.
55. The report recommended that the first stage be built by 1962, including a line down
the San Mateo Peninsula extending as far south as Palo Alto and a line on the east side of the
Bay extending as far south as Decoto (presently Union City). The first stage also would include
a line extending north into Matin County and lines extending to Richmond and Concord in the
East Bay. The second stage would be built by 1970 and would connect the Decoto and Palo
Alto lines in San Jose; it also would provide further extensions into Santa Clara, Sonoma, Napa,
and Contra Costa Counties. A third stage was to be built by 1990 and would include further
extensions into Napa, Sonoma, and Solano counties. Id. at 8-9.
56. Borough System Suggested for Bay Area Rapid Transit, San Francisco Chron., Apr.
24, 1956, at 2, col. 1.
57. Id.
58. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District Act, 1957 Cal. Stat. 2290 (codified at
CAL. PUB. UnT.. CODE §§ 28500-29757 (West 1983)).
59. Id. at 2335.
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proved fatal to the attempt to ensure participation by all nine counties.
If membership had been mandatory, today BART would be the truly
regional transit system once envisioned.
Santa Clara County asked the legislature to exclude it from the
BART District, claiming that it would not benefit from the system for
many years and did not want to suffer a higher tax rate in the interim.60
Powerful lobbying by manufacturing and agricultural interests opposed
to increased taxes was instrumental in mounting opposition to BART
in Santa Clara County. 6
San Mateo was the second county to withdraw from BART, largely
for political reasons.6 The sentiment in the county was that BART was
designed to promote the development of San Francisco as an economic
center and that San Mateo would become a bedroom community.6 San
Mateo politicians and developers opposed this idea; they were interested
in developing San Mateo both as a retail and industrial center and as
a residential community.64 San Mateo also was bothered by the fact that
many Santa Clara County residents would use BART; its termination
point would be Palo Alto, on the Santa Clara border, yet San Mateo
taxpayers would be paying for its construction. 5 A higher tax rate also
would put San Mateo County at a competitive'disadvantage to Santa
Clara County. Real estate developers who feared that businesses would
be driven to Santa Clara "made it clear that supervisors with further
political ambitions should not favor BART's plans." ' Southern Pacific
Railroad also influenced San Mateo supervisors to vote against BART.
Southern Pacific, which operated a passenger rail line from San Fran-
cisco to San Jose, feared that it would be forced to operate the re-
maining Santa Clara County portion of the line at a significant loss.67
Finally, Marin County withdrew from BART in 1962,68 following
more political haggling that continues to this day. BART planned to
run trains over the Golden Gate Bridge on a new deck built exclusively
for the trains, which BART engineers concluded was feasible. 69 But the
60. See KEY DEC iONs, supra note 21, at 35. The Santa Clara portion of the system was
not scheduled to be constructed until the second stage of construction, approximately eight years
after completion of the first stage. See supra note 55.
61. KEY DECISIONS, supra note 21, at 36.
62. Id. San Mateo County seceded from BART in 1961. Id.
63. Id. at 37.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 38. One of the San Mateo County supervisors was a retired Southern Pacific vice
president. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 39.
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Golden Gate Bridge and Highway District (GGBHD), a public agency
that controls the bridge, intended to build a second deck for auto-
mobiles and viewed BART as a threat to its political autonomy.70 The
GGBHD discounted a BART engineering study which concluded that
the bridge could structurally support BART trains, and instead it re-
tained its own engineers who reached the opposite conclusion. 71 One
San Francisco newspaper charged the GGBHD with doctoring its en-
gineering report by omitting information that would establish the bridge
as structurally able to support trains.7 2 A second engineering report later
confirmed that the bridge could not structurally support the trains.73
This report also received substantial criticism, particularly from BART
directors representing Marin County. 74 Several BART directors sug-
gested that the GGBHD be disbanded and the bridge be placed under
the same state authority that controlled the other tol bridges in the Bay
Area.75 Faced with the unresolved bridge-train dispute and financially
infeasible alternatives, the Marin County supervisors voted to withdraw
from BART.76
With technological and engineering advances such as the availa-
bility of lighter weight roadbed as well as lighter trains, it is likely that
the bridge could accommodate trains today.77 But the independent au-
thority of the GGBHD still presents difficulties. Although a large ma-
jority of residents from Matin County and the entire Bay Area favor
extending BART into Marin County,78 Marin County supervisors who
also serve on the GGBHD have refused to adopt such a plan.79 Despite
the views of his own constituents, the president of the GGBHD appears
particularly hostile to BART, stating that "BART still thinks of San
Francisco and the East Bay as being the ultimate destination of every
person on the face of the Earth."80
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Strauss' OK on Trains Omitted, San Francisco News-Call Bulletin, Oct. 5, 1961, at 1,
col. 6.
73. Engineers Reject Gate Span Trains, San Francisco Chron., Apr. 13, 1962, at 1, col. 6.
74. KEY DECnIONS, supra note 21, at 40.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. How Trains Would Place Strain on the Bridge, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 17, 1989,
at A4, col. 1.
78. Bay Area Wants New Bay Bridge, BART Extension, San Francisco Chron., July 19,
1989, at Al, col. 5.
79. Marin Supervisor Spurns BART Plans, San Francisco Chron., July 7, 1989, at A3, col.
4.
80. Id. (statement of Robert Stockwell, who at the time was chairman of the Matin County
Board of Supervisors in addition to serving as president of the GGBHD).
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These supervisors instead favor creating a new transit system be-
tween Main and Sonoma counties consisting of light rail or diesel-pow-
ered trains.8' One plan calls for a line from Santa Rosa in Sonoma
County to Larkspur in Main County. Passengers travelling to San
Francisco would be forced to transfer to a ferry in Larkspur. If the final
destination of these passengers were not in the immediate vicinity of
the ferry terminal in San Francisco, they would have to transfer to an-
other line in San Francisco. Passengers travelling between Marin County
and the East Bay or San Mateo County conceivably could take four
or five different transit lines to reach their final destination. 3 One re-
gional transportation agency could avoid such an inefficient fragmented
public transportation system.
The regional transportation system servingthe entire Bay Area,
envisioned in 1956, has never come close to being realized. Today, eight-
een years after BART first began operating, it still serves only parts of
three of the nine Bay Area counties and not a single extension has been
added.84
(4) Bay Conservation and Development Commission
Unlike the attempts to create a more limited form of regional agency
or government, the idea of a true Bay Area-wide regional government
became very popular in the mid-sixties. Encroachment on San Francisco
Bay was a major impetus for this interest. In 1850 the Bay covered
approximately 680 square miles; by 1960 it covered only 430 square
miles as a result of landfill and diking.8 5 A study completed by the Army
Corps of Engineers in 1959 determined that if landfill continued at the
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. For example, people travelling from Main County to San Francisco International Airport
first would take a Marin-Sonoma line to Larkspur, where they would transfer to the ferry. Upon
arriving in San Francisco, they would transfer to a Municipal Railway bus line, which would
take them to a BART or Caltrain Station to take them to the airport. Cf. New Regional Spirit
Springs up in Bay Area, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 8, 1989, at A4, col. I (commuter from
Vallejo to San Francisco spends two hours commuting in each direction over four different
transit lines).
The voters of both Manin and Sonoma Counties recently rejected a proposed sales tax increase
that would finance a light rail line in those counties. Matin Voters Trounce Transit Plan, San
Francisco Chron., Nov. 7, 1990, at AI0, col. 1.
84. But see Agreement to Extend BART to Airport Officially Signed, San Francisco Chron.,
Mar. 2, 1990, at A2, col. 1. (San Mateo County has joined the BART district, and an extension
to San Francisco International Airport from Daly City has been approved, to be completed in
2001. Two extensions in the East Bay also have been approved. Id.)
85. Baum, San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, 5 LNcoLN L.
REv. 98, 102 (1970).
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rate of filling that occurred between 1940 and 1957, the Bay would be
reduced to a mere channel within 100 years. 6 In 1965 the McAteer-Pe-
tris Act was passed by the California Legislature, creating the San Fran-
cisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC).8 The
BCDC was given four years to form a comprehensive plan for con-
servation of the Bay8 and the power to regulate all Bay filling during
this period 9
The BCDC recommended creating "a multi-purpose limited re-
gional government, concerned with other regional matters in addition
to the Bay." 9 The BCDC armed itself with a study showing that a
regional government could effectively protect the Bay and also be re-
sponsible for solid waste disposal, acquisition and operation of regional
parks and open space, air and water pollution control, and the satis-
faction of the entire region's transportation needs. 9' The authors of the
study believed that since "most problems affecting the Bay do not stop
at the water's edge (e.g. ports, airports, freeway routes, industrial sites),
a multi-purpose agency could do a better job of coordinating and ac-
commodating competing uses" while avoiding further fragmentation of
the Bay Area with yet another special purpose district. 92 As an alter-
native to creating a regional government, the BCDC recommended that
it become a special purpose agency with authority over all landfill and
development on the Bay. 93 The California Legislature chose this latter
course.
94
(5) Multipurpose Regional Government
Although the California Legislature chose not to create a regional
government for the Bay Area in 1969, it had studied the feasibility of
86. Berke, San Francisco Bay: A Successful Case of Coastal Zone Planning Legislation and
Implementation, 15 Un. L. 487, 490 (1983).
87. 1965 Cal. Stat. 2940 (codified as amended at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66600-66607 (West
1983 & Supp. 1985)).
88. 1965 Cal. Stat. 2946 (codified at CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66630-66631 (West 1983 & Supp.
1991)). The California Legislature amended this statute in 1969 when the BCDC became
permanent. 1969 Cal. Stat. 1395.
89. 1965 Cal. Stat. 2943 (codified as amended at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66632 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1991)).
90. SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMiENT COMISSION, SAN FRANcIscO BAY
PLAN 35 (1969) [hereinafter SAN FRANCISCO BAY PLAN].
91. S. ScoTr & J. BOLLENS, GOVERNMENT: REGIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR BAY CONSERVATION
AND DEvELopmENT 2 (included in the Supplement to SAN FRANCISCO BAY PLAN, supra note 90,
at 501, 504).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See supra note 16.
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regional government. In 1967 the legislature formed a Joint Committee
on Bay Area Regional Organization.95 In 1967 and 1968 the Joint Com-
mittee held public meetings in the nine Bay Area counties during which
local government representatives and community members presented
their views. 96 In addition, the Joint Committee conducted three hearings
at which it sought expert commentary regarding the specific legal and
structural requirements of a regional government 7 After hearing from
hundreds of witnesses, the Joint Committee summarized its findings.
There was support for some type of regional control in the areas of
air pollution, water quality, solid waste disposal, parks and open space,
Bay conservation, and transportation, including bridges and roads.9
Despite the findings of the Joint Committee and the realization by
many community leaders that regional control was needed, the legis-
lature accomplished nothing. Assemblyman John Knox of Richmond,
chairman of the Joint Committee, introduced several pieces of legis-
lation between 1969 and 1974 that sought to create a limited regional
government, but none of these bills made it to the governor's desk. 9
The 1974 bill provides an example of the strong opposition this
legislative effort encountered. The bill called for creating a new planning
agency for the Bay Area which would take over the responsibilities of
the voluntary planning agency, the Association of Bay Area Govern-
ments (ABAG).1° The new agency ultimately would become the gov-
erning board of several Bay Area special purpose districts, including
the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and the Bay Area Sew-
age Services Agency, the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Devel-
opment Commission, and the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District. 101
The bill would not have affected independent transportation districts
such as BART or the many other Bay Area special purpose districts.
The agency would have had the power to review and comment upon,
95. California Legislature, Joint Committee on Bay Area Regional Organization: Public
Hearings, A Summary iii (1968) [hereinafter Joint Committee Public Hearings].
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 3-18.
99. A.B. 711, Cal. Legis., Reg. Sess., Final Calendar of Legis. Business, Assembly Final
History, Part 2, at 242 (1969); A.B. 1057, Cal. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1971) (as amended by the
senate on Oct. 13, 1971); A.B. 220, Cal. Legis., Reg. Sess., Final Calendar of Legislative Business,
Assembly Final History, Part 2, at 138 (1972); A.B. 2040, Cal. Legis. Reg. Sess. (1974) (as
amended by senate on Aug. 5, 1974); California State Legislature, Senate Local Government
Committee, Hearing on A.B. 2040-Bay Area Regional Planning Agency, May 17, 1974, San
Francisco [hereinafter Hearing on A.B. 2040]; see also Marks & Taber, Prospects for Regional
Planning in Calfornia, 4 PAC. L.J. 117, 136 (1973) (discussion of A.B. 1057, introduced in
1971).
100. A.B. 2040, Cal. Legis. Reg. Sess., supra note 99, at 3.
101. Id. at 35 (Article 12).
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any application by a city, county, or special district for state or federal
funds for any project that might have a regional impact. 102 In this man-
ner the agency would assume a planning role for the Bay Area.
Despite the bill's relatively innocuous provisions, it met significant
political resistance from cities, counties, special purpose districts, and
other groups opposed to another layer of government. 03 The bill passed
the assembly in 1974, but the state senate defeated it with the help of
southern California senators who were concerned that such an agency
would become a model for Los Angeles and San Diego, something to
which they were strongly opposed.1 4 The defeat of Knox's latest bill
was the end of "regionalism" in the Bay Area for the next fourteen
years. 101
B. Urban Problems Facing the Bay Area that Only a Metropolitan Form
of Government Can Address Effectively
Every large urban area has its share of problems. What makes the
Bay Area unique is not the large number of municipalities, but the frag-
mentation of authority among so many different districts and agen-
cies. 16 Though it is beyond the scope of this Note to cover every urban
problem that needs addressing, regional government could go a long
way toward solving problems in the following areas of particular im-
portance: transportation, land use planning, water supply, and disposal
of liquid and solid waste.
(1) Transportation
The state of the Bay Area's public transportation system today is
dismal. The existing problems result from twenty years of repeated fail-
ure to implement proposals for improving public transit. In 1970 the
102. Id. at 27-28.
103. Sde Hearing on A.B. 2040, supra note 99. The following people spoke in opposition to
A.B. 2040: Joseph C. Houghteling, BCDC, id. at 10-15; Theresa Dietrich, American Independent
Party, id. at 44-45; Tim Leslie, County Supervisors Association of California, id. at 45-65; John
Tuteur, Supervisor, Napa County, id. at 108-13; Richard Brann, Supervisor, Solano County, id.
at 114-16; Dorothea Keener, No Bay Area Government Committee, id. at 157-61; Billie Bowles,
California Republican Assembly, id. at 161-82; James Groom, President, Sonoma County
Taxpayers Association, id. at 184-90.
104. See Senate Kills Bill for Bay Superagency, San Francisco Chron., Sept. 13, 1975, at 2,
col. 6; see also New Regional Spirit Springs Up in Bay Area, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 8,
1989, at A4, col. 1 (regionalism is back for the first time since southern California legislatures
defeated bill in the seventies).
105. New Regional Spirit Springs Up in Bay Area, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 8, 1989, at
A4, col. 1.
106. For a partial list of Bay Area agencies, see supra notes 13, 16.
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state legislature created the Metropolitan Transportation Commission
(MTC) to provide "comprehensive regional transportation planning"
for each of the nine Bay Area counties.'0 The MTC's first task was
preparing a comprehensive regional transportation plan by 1973.1m The
MTC plan proposed a number of improvements for Bay Area public
transit, which the MTC considered important for creating an effective
regional transit system. These improvements included the following:
(1) Creating a rapid transit system on the Geary Corridor in San
Francisco ' 09 (the report stressed that a San Francisco Municipal Railway
"Metro" light rail system would be preferred to a BART system);
(2) Creating a rapid transit system between Marin County and San
Francisco, either by having trains travel through an underwater tube
between the two counties, or by having trains travel along the Geary
Corridor of San Francisco and then transferring passengers to buses that
would cross the Golden Gate Bridge;
(3) Extending BART to San Francisco International Airport and
eventually down the San Mateo corridor to San Jose;
(4) Improving the Southern Pacific Commuter Service between San
Jose and San Francisco to a level at which the service could become
an integral part of a regional transportation system."0
None of these five goals has been met. Despite extensive discussion,
with the exception of the recently approved BART extension to San
Francisco International Airport,' there have been no attempts to im-
plement them." 2
107. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66502 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
108. See METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION COmmissiON, REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLAN FOR
TnE SAN FtANcisco BAY AREA (June 27, 1973, revised Aug. 28, 1974) [hereinafter REGIONAL
TRANSPORTATION PLAN].
109. Geary Boulevard is a major thoroughfare extending east-west between downtown San
Francisco and the Pacific Ocean. Although the San Francisco Municipal Railway's "Metro"
light-rail system extends between downtown San Francisco and other parts of the city, there is
currently no Muni-Metro rail line on the Geary Corridor. Recent plans have been proposed to
extend a rail line on Geary Boulevard. What A Boost in S.F. Sales Tax Would Do for Public
Transit, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 16, 1989, at A6, col. 1.
110. REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLAN, supra note 108, at 57-65.
111. See supra note 84.
112. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text (regarding proposed rapid transit between
San Francisco and Matin); see also Funds OK'd to Extend Cal Train in S.F., San Francisco
Examiner, Sept. 20, 1990, at Al, col. 6 (regarding a proposed extension of CalTrain into the
Financial District of San Francisco); What A Boost in S.F. Sales Tax Would Do For Public
Transit, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 16, 1989, at A6, col.1 (regarding a proposal to construct a
Muni-Metro extension on the Geary Corridor); BART Director Urges Phased-in Marin Extension,
San Francisco Chron., Sept. 9, 1989, at A2, col. 3 (noting it would cost $3 billion for an
underwater tube between Marin and San Francisco for BART trains and that it would be built
in stages); Bart Extension to Marin Might Cost $3 Billion, San Francisco Chron., Aug. 31, 1989,
at AS, col. I (engineering consultants estimating that new extension would cost more than $3
billion).
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Furthermore, the proposals often faced political barriers. For ex-
ample, when BART proposed developing a plan to extend to Main
County, the GGBHD and the Marin County supervisors suggested that
they were not interested in BART and could take care of their own
transportation problems.11 3 When State Senator Quentin Kopp sug-
gested that a train line should be constructed between San Francisco
and Santa Rosa and that the GGBHD should be run by the state agency
that runs other Bay Area bridges, one GGBHD member suggested that
transit in Main and Sonoma counties was not the concern of a San
Francisco senator.1 4 When BART proposed building a station within
its own district it ran into other political problems. Upon discovering
that BART might build a station in the East Bay town of Hercules,
a group of Hercules residents protested, fearing that the station would
adversely affect Hercules' growth pattern. The Hercules City Council
threatened to sue BART."5 Because Hercules also is served by AC Tran-
sit and because there was some doubt whether BART was necessary to
serve the needs of Hercules alone, BART decided not to carry out its
plans.11 6
A single agency with the authority to plan an efficient transpor-
tation system for the entire region could deal more effectively with po-
litical fighting that now occurs between transit agencies and local
governments. Counties and municipalities might challenge the regional
agency's plans, but they would be unable to block implementation of
transit improvements as long as the agency established that its proposals
were necessary for the entire region. A town such as Hercules would
be unable to use a separate transit agency, such as AC Transit, as lev-
erage to prevent a rapid transit station from being constructed. The
California Legislature has made efforts to try to consolidate at least
some of the region's many transit districts to form a more efficient
system." 7 These efforts have failed.
(2) Land Use
Combining the Bay Area's transportation systems into one regional
agency is not enough if that agency does not have some control over
physical planning in the region. To plan an efficient transportation sys-
113. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
114. See Kopp Proposes Transit System for North Bay, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 14, 1989,
at A4, col. 3 (statement of Robert Stockwell, a GGBHD member and Main County Supervisor).
115. Bay Area 'Turf Wars' Stymie Regional Planning, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 9, 1989,
at Al, col. 1.
116. Id.
117. See Regional Transit Service Consolidation Hearing, supra note 13.
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tern, it is necessary to know in what direction high concentrations of
people will be traveling. An example of how flawed land use planning
can interfere with an efficient transportation system is demonstrated by
the mammoth office complexes built over the past decade in the San
Ramon Valley or Interstate 680 Corridor, located in the East Bay coun-
ties of Alameda and Contra Costa.11 8 Two complexes in particular,
Bishop Ranch in San Ramon and Hacienda Business Park in Pleas-
anton, have brought tens of thousands of daffy commuters into an area
that fifteen years ago was nothing more than a quiet suburban town." 9
As a result there is virtually no public transportation to serve these com-
plexes, which were designed to accommodate automobiles. 12° Tremen-
dous traffic congestion clogs the Interstate 680 Corridor every morning
and evening, an obvious result of too many cars on roads not designed
for their numbers.12' Many drivers are lower-income office workers who
were transferred from central city offices in San Francisco. 22 The San
Ramon Valley is an upper-middle-class, low density community without
affordable housing,' forcing many of these workers to drive very long
distances from areas where affordable housing is available.' 24
Such development results in greater overall commute time, in-
creased air pollution, and worse urban sprawl.'2 If one agency in charge
of transit for the Bay Area also had some control over land use de-
velopment, it could plan for suburban work communities. Public trans-
portation could be built to connect the work community with surrounding
population centers, thereby providing a mass transit alternative to cars
and shortening commute time. Furthermore, development could be more
dense, allowing more businesses to locate in a smaller area and making
public transportation to the area more efficient. Additional affordable
housing, including apartment buildings, could be built in the vicinity
118. This region extends from Walnut Creek, where Interstate 680 intersects with State
Highway 24, south to Interstate 580 in Pleasanton. See Danner, Bishop Ranch, then Hacienda
Turned 1-680 into a Job Center, San Francisco Business Times, Oct. 19, 1987, § 1, at 29.
119. Id.; see also SENATE URBAN GROWTH PoucY PROJECT, DoEs CALiFiffA NEED A POuCY
TO MANAGE URBAN GRowTH? 24-27 (1989) (the migration of companies from center cities to
suburban office parks such as Bishop Ranch and Hacienda Business Park has contributed to
urban sprawl).
120. See Sweeney, Commuting Woes Plague Contra Costa County, The Business Journal-
San Jose, Apr. 20, 1987, § 2, at 3 [hereinafter Commuting Woes]; Sweeney, Contra Costa
Corridor: A Growing Problem?, SAN FRANcisco Bus., Sept. 1986, at 6 [hereinafter Contra Costa
Corridor].
121. See Commuting Woes, supra note 120, at 3; Contra Costa Corridor, supra note 120, at
6.
122. See Commuting Woes, supra note 120, at 3.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
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of the business parks, allowing more people to live closer to their jobs
and decreasing the number of commuters. 126
Large office complexes are not the only types of developments that
lead to urban sprawl. New housing sub-divisions, shopping centers, air-
port expansions, entertainment centers, and other types of large de-
velopments that attract a large number of people all have a regional
effect. A regional government must have some level of control over
these types of developments or its efforts to plan for the region will
be futile.
(3) Water Supply
Other problem areas for the Bay Area and its balkanized govern-
ment concern the disposition of water, garbage, and raw sewage. The
regional impact of a recent drought has brought management of the
area's water supply to the forefront of regional concerns.1 27 The drought
does not affect all Bay Area residents equally. The severity of water
rationing in the Bay Area ranges from drastic in Marin County, 12 to
severe in San Francisco and Santa Clara Counties, 29 to mild in Alameda
and Napa Counties. 30 Still other locations such as Sonoma County have
not imposed any rationing. 3' Furthermore, until this past year, southern
California was not nearly as adversely affected by the present drought
as the Bay Area, 3 2 an ironic result in light of the fact that southern
California imports a large portion of its water from northern Cali-
fornia. 133
126. Bay Area Council policy analyst Thomas Cook suggested that the best way to correct
congested highways is to build affordable housing, particularly apartment buildings. Id.
127. See Bay Area Drought Plans Are Dusted Off, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 24, 1990, at
Al, col. 1.
128. Marin Water Board OKs 50 Gallons-a-Day Ration, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 8 1991,
at A3, col.1.
129. City Water Rationing: No More Nice Guys, San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 25, 1991, at
A4, col. 1.
130. See Wilson Orders Water Reduced for All, San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 15, 1991, at
Al, Col.1.
131. Id. But See Severe Water Rationing OKd for S.F., San Francisco Chron., Feb. 27,
1991, at Al, col. 1 (Sonoma County calls for voluntary 15% rationing even though it has
abundant supplies of water, mainly to fend off any state move to impose tough drought measures
on it).
132. No Drought Down South, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 16, 1989, at A34, col. 1; Bay
Area to Buy Water from Southern California, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 24, 1989, at Al, col.
1; Why Bay Area is Short of Water and Southern California Isn't, San Francisco Chron., Apr.
25, 1988, at Al, col. 1; see also Making Water History, L.A. Times, Mar. 3, 1989, pt. 2, at 6,
col. 1 (Metropolitan Water District of southern California to sell water to Bay Area districts).
But see Big Southern California Water Cutback, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 13, 1991, at Al,
col.4 (southern California now facing water rationing during this fifth year of drought).
133. Every Drop Matters, L.A. Times, Mar. 20, 1989, pt. 2, at 4, col. 1 (Library ed.).
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Greater Los Angeles and San Diego have much of their water sup-
plies coordinated by one water district,14 while the Bay Area, a much
smaller region, divides its water responsibilities among several different
water agencies. 35 One large district is better able to coordinate water
supplies. Because a large district needs to plan for a much larger number
of people, it receives its water from several different sources. 3 6 Thus,
if one particular source is having a dry year, water from other sources
will continue to provide all customers with an adequate water supply. 137
If more than one source is having a dry year, the district can impose
uniform rationing restrictions on its customers. In the Bay Area if a
district's water source is having an extremely dry year, it must impose
rationing and possibly make expensive water purchases from other dis-
tricts.'
(4) Disposal of Liquid and Solid Waste
The waste disposal and raw sewage conditions also are worsening
as the Bay Area grows. Almost every county either has exhausted or
134. The Metropolitan Water District in southern California controls all water for the
multicounty Los Angeles Basin, as well-as for San Diego County. W. CROUCH, J. Boum.Es &
S. Sconr, CALFORmA GovER mENT AND PoLmcs 258-59 (1977). The Metropolitan Water District
currently serves more than 14 million customers. Every Drop Matters, L.A. Times, Mar. 20,
1989, pt. 2, at 4, col. 1 (Library ed.).
135. The Bay Area water departments are the following: The San Francisco Water Department,
which serves San Francisco, San Mateo, and parts of Santa Clara and Alameda counties;
EBMUD, which serves the rest of Alameda and parts of Contra Costa counties; the Santa Clara
County Valley Water District, which serves all of the South Bay not served by the San Francisco
Water Department; the Main Municipal Water District, which serves Main County; and the
county water departments of Costra Contra, Sonoma, Solano, and Napa. See W. CROUCH, J.
Bou.-Ns & S. Scorr, supra note 134, at 258-59; Bay Area Drought Plans are Dusted Off, San
Francisco Chron., Jan. 24, 1990, at Al, col. I.
136. The Metropolitan Water District currently acquires its water from four different sources:
the Colorado River; the Owens Valley and Mono Lake in the eastern Sierra range; the State
Water Project (through the Sacramento River and Sacramento Delta); and from the Federal
Central Valley Project, which takes water from several Sierra rivers. If Drought Continues,
Scenarios Run From Benign to Apocalyptic, L.A. Times, July 29, 1990, at Al, col.5. The San
Francisco Water Department gets 85% of its water supply from the Hetch Hetchy Reservoir in
Yosemite National Park. Bay Area Drought Plans Are Dusted Off, San Francisco Chron., Jan.
24, 1990, at Al, col. 1. The Main Municipal Water District depends on local rainfall for its
water supply. Id.
137. In 1989, for example, while the Bay Area suffered through continuing drought, the
Metropolitan Water District in southern California had an ample supply of water because the
Colorado River was having a particularly wet year. Every Drop Matters, L.A. Times, Mar. 20,
1989, pt. 2, at 4, col. 1 (Library ed.).
138. Bay Area Drought Plans Are Dusted Off, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 24, 1990, at Al,
col. 1; see also State Hopes to Buy Yuba River Water to Help Relieve Drought, L.A. Times,
Mar. 15, 1989, pt. 1, at 3, col. 4 Valley ed. (several Bay Area water districts plan to purchase
water through the state from Yuba County, which has excess supplies).
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almost exhausted its available dump site for solid waste. 3 9 Meanwhile,
cities are dumping unsatisfactorily treated sewage into the Bay, rivers,
and other tributaries, affecting the drinking water of other commu-
nities. 140 Despite repeated calls to address these problems on a regional
scale,' 4 ' counties and municipalities continue to seek short-term solu-
tions. Furthermore, the Bay Area is without a uniform recycling plan. 42
Materials meant to be recycled often end up at dumping sites because
there is no coordinated effort to market recycled materials .14
A regional government is needed to locate available dumping sites
for the entire Bay Area, to develop an incinerator if necessary, and
perhaps most importantly, to implement a uniform Bay Area recycling
plan that will include every city and county in the region. Simultane-
ously, a regional government could establish a sewage plan for the entire
area, set minimum standards for treatment before dumping, and de-
termine where treated sewage should be disposed. Planning powers would
enable this regional government to increase sewer capacity prior to de-
velopment of less populated areas to end the common practice of over-
loading the capacity of present sewer systems. 1"4
As the Bay Area approaches the twenty-first century, it still is with-
out a true regional government that can address adequately region-wide
urban problems. This result is not because Bay Area citizens have lacked
vision. Numerous attempts were made throughout the twentieth century
to create a regional government,' 5 multipurpose regional agencies," 6
and a unified Bay Area transportation system, 47 but each of these ef-
forts failed. The executive director of the Association of Bay Area Gov-
ernments, Revan Tranter, said in 1984, "The San Francisco Bay Area
can boast of a remarkable record in the art of planning-that is iden-
tifying a problem and proposing possible solutions. Unfortunately it
139. A Standoff Between Trash and Trout, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 18, 1988 (This World
Magazine), at 17, col. 1; Bay Area Could Face a Crisis Over Garbage, San Francisco Chron.,
Aug. 8, 1988, at A5, col. 1; see Sonoma County Sues Dairies Over Soil Tests, San Francisco
Chron., Aug. 17, 1989, at A8, col. 1.
140. Reports Warn About Toxins in S.F. Bay, San Francisco Chron., Aug. 10, 1989, at B7,
col. 3.
141. See, e.g., Garbage Crisis, San Francisco Chron., Aug. 9, 1988, at A18, col. 1 (editorial
calling for a regional plan to solve region's solid waste problem).
142. See San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 2, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
143. See Id.
144. See Dwindling Sewer Capacity May Bar S.F. in Pleasanton, San Francisco Examiner,
Jan. 29, 1990, at A8, col. 4 (proposed development in Pleasanton could be blocked by already
overburdened sewer system; Oakland's threat to block new sewer line to bay).
145. See supra notes 29-50, 90-94, and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 51-84 and accompanying text; see also supra note 13 (regarding senate
proposal to consolidate transportation systems in Bay Area).
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seldom gets beyond the planning stage."' 14 As the Bay Area continues
growing without a regional plan, its corresponding urban problems are
growing at an even faster rate. 49 As one commentator noted, "There's
not a local community in the Bay Area that doesn't want clean air,
unpolluted water, or a better transportation system. How best to ac-
complish these goals? It can be done with aggressive regional leadership
without eroding local control.' ' 50
II. What Type of Regional Government Would be Most'
Suitable for the Bay Area?
Certainly the Bay Area does not suffer alone from the problems
of regional growth. Every major metropolitan region in the countr-y
suffers from similar problems, although the number and severity vary.
Metropolitan Los Angeles, for example, which includes several counties
and hundreds of cities, also is calling for some type of regional gov-
ernment to handle problems concerning transportation, air quality, and
waste disposal 5 1 Throughout the country, efforts to combine govern-
mental functions are moving forward as people realize that many urban
problems are regional, not local.1 52 In the New York City metropolitan
area, which encompasses three states and a multitude of counties, cities,
towns, and special purpose districts, there also are calls for some type
of regional control. There is, however, a realization that a true regional
government could never be created over such a large, multistate area. 53
The Bay Area's problems are acute because the Bay Area is the fourth
148. R. TaNTErr, BEYoND Pt NTh6O: A CAuL To AcrTio 1 (1984) (available in Institute of
Government Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley).
149. See, e.g., BART Strike Commute Could Preview 2002, San Francisco Examiner, Sept.
25, 1988 at A14, col. I (estimates that increased traffic during present BART strike will be
routine by the year 2002). Every Drop Matters, L.A. Times, Mar. 20, 1989, pt. 2, at 4, col. 1
(Bay Area relying increasingly on Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta for water supplies, which is
exacerbating erosion of Delta and San Francisco Bay); The Outlook for Bay Area's Industrial
Waste, San Francisco Chron., Sept. 17, 1988, at A5, col. I (Association of Bay Area Governments
says local governments are expected to generate six million tons annually of hazardous waste
materials by the year 2000 without the facilities for proper disposal); Bay Area Could Face a
Crisis Over Garbage, San Francisco Chron., Aug. 8, 1988, at A5, col. 1 (serious shortage of
available dumping sites in Bay Area); A Chance to Recapture Planning Leadership-Reconstruc-
tion Driven by Regional Vision, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 26, 1989, at B2, col. 1 (chart
demonstrates how tax structure favoring industrial and commercial development throughout the
Bay Area will create a tremendous housing and labor force by 2005, and will contribute to
millions of annual commuting hours and further suburban sprawl).
150. R. Tpaukmx, supra note 148, at 10.
151. For Regional Government, L.A. Times, Sept. 23, 1989, pt. 2, at 8, col. I (Editorial).
152. As Problems Grow, So Does the Push for Regional Government, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27,
1986, § 1, at 25, col. 2.
153. Id.
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largest metropolitan area in the country'5 4 and one of the most frag-
mented with nine counties, ninety-eight municipalities, and several hun-
dred special purpose districts.'55 It does have the advantage, however,
of being located entirely within one state.
A. Types of Metropolitan Government
Although regional government rarely has been implemented in the
United States, it has been studied thoroughly and scholars have de-
veloped several basic models for regional government. 5 6 The one-gov-
ernment approach involves consolidating all the smaller government
entities in an area into one large supergovernment. 57 The "two-tier"
approach retains local governments to handle local matters but creates
a secondary government to handle matters of regional concern.' 8 Two
examples of a two-tier approach are the "urban county," in which some
powers are transferred to the county level, and the "federation," in
which a new metropolitan government is created with powers to address
regional matters and municipal governments retain control over local
matters. 5 9 A third type of metropolitan government is the regional um-
brella agency which creates a regional plan of development and then
coordinates the different single-power special districts in the area to
ensure compliance with the plan.160 This type of agency usually will have
indirect powers, such as the power to veto any major development pro-
jects or the power to block state or federal funds to the special purpose
agencies.' 6'
154. See supra note 3.
155. See supra notes 1, 4-5, 13, 16, and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., C. ADRIAN, GovERNING URBAN AMERICA, STRUCTURE, Pouncs, A" ADMIN-
IsTRATIoN 242-56 (1955); ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOL-
ITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 85-113 (1966) [hereinafter METROPOLrAN AMERICA:
CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM]; J. Ho & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at xi-xxii; S. ScoTT & J.
BOLLENS, supra note 91, at 5-10.
157. METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM, supra note 156, at 98-101; J.
HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at xii-xiv; S. ScoTT & J. BoLLENs, supra note 91, at 5.
158. C. ADRIAN, supra note 156, at 249-54; METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE TO FED-
ERALIsM, supra note 156, at 90-93, 104-06; J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at xiv-xix; S.
ScoTT & J. BOLLENS, supra note 91, at 5-7.
159. C. ADRIAN, supra note 156, at 249-54; METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE TO FED-
ERALIsM, supra note 156, at 90-93, 104-06; J. HoRAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at xiv-xix; S.
SCOTT & J. BOLLENS, supra note 91, at 5-7.
160. J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at xxii; S. SCOTT & J. BOLLENS, supra note 91,
at 14.
161. J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at xxii; S. SCOTT & J. BOLLENS, supra note 91,
at 14.
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(1) The Single Government Approach
There are basically three ways to establish a single government for
a metropolitan area: annexation of unincorporated land to form a larger
city, consolidation of two or more cities to create a larger city, or con-
solidation of all the cities in a county into a city-county government.1 62
None of these alternatives is a realistic possibility for the Bay Area,
which encompasses ninety-eight municipalities and nine counties. 63 To
form a single government for the Bay Area, all nine counties and all
ninety-eight municipalities would have to consolidate into one Bay Area
city-county supergovernment. The California Constitution would re-
quire a popular vote at both the county and city levels, 164 meaning that
the measure would have to be passed in 107 separate elections. It is
unlikely that the measure would pass in a single one of these elections;
the chance of it passing in all 107 is virtually nonexistent. Furthermore,
such a supergovernment would be too large to be effective.
(2) The Two-Tier Government Approach
a. The Urban County
In an urban county the county government takes on matters of
regional concern and the municipal governments retain their autonomy,
exercising control over local issues.' 6 In essence, the urban county is
the same as a federation, explained below, except that the urban county
does not require the creation of a new government. 66 This type of re-
gional government is politically much easier to establish; the county
simply authorizes amendment of its charter to allow the transfer of
certain powers from the municipal governments to the county govern-
ment.167 The urban county would be completely ineffective, however,
in a metropolitan region that extends beyond the boundaries of a single
county, as is the case in the Bay Area.
One example of an urban county government in the United States
can be found in metropolitan Miami, Florida. In 1957 the voters of
162. J. HoRAN & 1. TAYLoR, supra note 22, at xiii.
163. See supra notes 1, 4 and accompanying text.
164. CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, §§ 1(a), 2(b).
165. C. ADRIAN, supra note 156, at 249-50, 253-54; M "moPorrAN AimA: CHALLENGE TO
FEnDmnism, supra note 156, at 90-93; J. HoRAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at xiv-xvii; S.
Scorr & J. BoLLENs, supra note 91, at 5-6.
166. See MEmoPouTrAN AmERcA CALLENGE To FEDERALISM, supra note 156, at 90-93; J.
Howe & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at xvi; S. ScoTr & J. BouEN s, supra note 91, at 5-7.
167. MEmROPOLITAN A MRCA: CHALLENGE TO FEDmwism, supra note 156, at 90-91.
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Dade County, in which the entire Metropolitan Statistical Area' 1 of
Miami was located, passed a new county charter transferring many of
the powers of the twenty-six existing municipalities to a new county
government. 169 The county government took charge of expressways,
public transportation (including airports), traffic control, air pollution
control, construction of an integrated water and sewer system, and reg-
ulation of building codes in unincorporated areas; 70 the municipalities
retained control of local services not specifically transferred over to the
County government.1 7' The Dade County Metropolitan Government has
had its share of hurdles, 172 but it generally has been considered suc-
cessful in addressing many of the regional problems of that area.173 Al-
though such a government is not a possibility in the Bay Area, 74 it
demonstrates how a regional government successfully can address re-
gional problems.
b. The Federation
A federation essentially is no different than an urban county except
that a new layer of government is created to assume control of matters
of regional concern. Numerous attempts to create federation-type re-
gional governments in United States cities have failed to pass in ref-
erendum votes. 75 A good example of a metropolitan federation is found
in Toronto, Ontario. In 1953 the Ontario Legislature passed a bill cre-
168. See supra note 15 (definition of Metropolitan Statistical Area).
169. See J. HoRAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 87, 90, 94.
170. See METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM, supra note 156, at 92; J.
HoRAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 95-97, 100-01.
171. The county government was authorized to set minimum standards for municipalities in
providing basic services. Should a municipality fail to meet these standards, the county was
authorized to take control of the service. Examples of local matters that municipalities were
authorized to control were police and fire protection, local zoning controls, garbage collection,
maintenance of local parks, playgrounds, recreational programs, and public library service. Many
municipalities have transferred their control over these matters to the county government. See
ADVISORY CoMIssIo N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROMISE A
PERFORMANCE, SuasTATE REOIONAUSM AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, VOL. II, CASE STUDIEs 9 (1973)
[hereinafter REGIONAL GOVmuANCE: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE]; J. HoR.A & I. TAYLOR, supra
note 22, at 95-97, 100-01.
172. See, e.g., J. HoRA 1 & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 98-105.
173. See J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 98-105; REGIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROMISE
AND PERFORMANCE, supra note 171, at 10-15.
174. This type of government, under which the cities retain their autonomy, would be easier
to create than a supergovernment. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text. Creating an
urban county government only would require a consolidation of the Bay Area's nine counties
and not a consolidation of the 98 municipalities. Although still virtually impossible, theoretically,
a referendum is easier to pass in nine elections than in 107.
175. C. ADRLAN, supra note 156, at 251; see also supra notes 29-50 and accompanying text
(describing attempts to create regional governments in the Bay Area).
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ating a metropolitan federation government for the Toronto metro-
politan area. 176 The federation then consisted of thirteen municipalities:
Toronto and twelve suburban municipalities.1" In 1967 the federation
act was amended to consolidate the thirteen municipalities into Toronto
and five boroughs.178
Because "home rule traditions are not nearly as strong in Canada
as they are in United States,' ' 79 and also because there was no re-
quirement of a popular vote,8° the Ontario Provincial Government did
not give the people of metropolitan Toronto an opportunity to vote on
the creation of a regional government.'8 ' In fact, in 1967 the Provincial
Government even rearranged city lines and eliminated certain smaller
cities without a popular vote.'8 Thus, one of the main reasons for the
successful implementation of Toronto's federation government is that
it was created without the referendum process, something that has foiled
many attempts at government reorganization in the United States.'83
When it was first created, the Metropolitan Government of To-
ronto (Metro) consisted of an executive council composed of twelve
members from Toronto, one member from each of the twelve suburbs,
and an independent chairperson to be elected by the council.'1' Mem-
bership on the executive council since has increased to forty, with a
much higher number representing the boroughs. 8 5
Initially, Metro's power was limited. Its major responsibility was
borrowing money to finance the construction of a sewer system for the
suburbs, new expressways, sidewalks, and schools. 6 Eventually, Metro
176. Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act, 1953, 2 Euz. 2, ch. 73 (Ont. 1953) (amended
as 4 & 5 Euz. 2, ch. 53 (Ont. 1956)); see also J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 113;
Milner, The Metropolitan Toronto Plan, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 570, 577-78 (1957).
177. J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 109.
178. Id. at 120. Bill 81-A, "An Act to Amend the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto
Act" (1967) (Incorporated into Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act, ONr. REv. STAT., ch.
314 (1980)).
179. J. HoRAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 114. For a discussion of home rule, see supra
notes 23-28 and accompanying text; infra Part III.
180. See J. HoR & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 114.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 120-22. Eliminating cities and rearranging borders without a popular vote would
be unconstitutional in California. See CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, §§ 1(a), 2(b).
183. C. ADAN, supra note 156, at 251; J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 114; See
also supra notes 29-50 and accompanying text (describing attempts to create regional governments
in the Bay Area).
184. J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 115.
185. MuiucipA=rY OF METRoPoUTAN ToRoNTo, ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1986) [hereinafter AN-
NuAL REPORT].
186. NATIONAL ASSOCIAION"OF REoIONAL CouNcILs, SPcLCU REPORT, METRoPoLrrAN To-
RoNTo CouNcm: A UNiQuE REGIONAL APPROACH, Report No. 13, at 2 (1978) [hereinafter SpacLu
REPORT]; see also Milner, supra note 176, at 579 (regarding debenture borrowing for municipal
purposes).
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began taking over more and more regional responsibilities, including
development and operation of a unified transportation system, pro-
vision of water for the entire region, disposal of solid waste, operation
of a metropolitan police force, operation of emergency services, housing
for the elderly, developmental control, and operation of regional parks.' 7
Metro has been widely regarded as a great success.8 By the mid-
seventies Metro had developed an integrated system of highways and
public transportation, including subways, streetcars, and buses.18 9 Its
handling of sewage and water supply problems has been even more im-
pressive. Before Metro existed, Toronto's water supply was very limited
and demand was increasing rapidly as the region continued to grow. 9°
Raw sewage was being dumped into rivers because the few treatment
plants in the region could not handle the increased amount of sewage.19'
With its financial clout Metro was able to undertake the massive project
of building reservoirs, water purification plants, and sewage treatment
plants. 92 Within a few years metropolitan Toronto had more than enough
available water and a complete sewage treatment system able to handle
the area's rapid growth over the past three decades. 193
Metro also consolidated solid waste disposal operations in the re-
gion beginning in 1966.194 Before 1966 each municipality disposed of
its own solid waste. This was not a significant problem because there
was ample open space on which to deposit the waste. 9 As the pop-
ulation grew, however, available dump sites began filling up and land
for disposal sites no longer was available.196 When Metro took control
of operations, it located large disposal sites far beyond its geographical
limits. 97 As people began moving near these sites, Metro located dis-
187. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 185, at 3; SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 186, at 2.
188. See J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 131-33; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 185,
at 2; SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 186, at 1-3; see also 5 ADVISORY COMMISsION ON INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A LOOK TO THE NORTH: CANADIAN REGIONAL EXPERIENCE, SUBSTATE
REGIONALISM AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 34 (1974) [hereinafter A LOOK TO THE NORTH] (in the
20 years following the creation of Metro Toronto, "the achievements of Metro Toronto were
extensive, particularly in the physical provision of services, which were necessary to a doubling
population"); PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERIES: BIBLIOGRAPHY, TORONTO AND ITS METROPOLITAN
GOVERNMENT: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 1-2 (1986) (the metropolitan government "can work, and work
superbly").
189. J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 131.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id.; A LOOK TO Tim NORTH, supra note 188, at 34, 41.
194. A LOOK TO Ta NORTH, supra note 188, at 40.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 40-41.
197. Id. at 41.
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posal sites further and further away from the Metro limits.'9 Solid waste
disposal always will be a problem because people do not like living near
garbage dumping sites. With its greater financial resources, however,
Metro was able to purchase bigger disposal sites, located beyond its
boundaries,'9 and to operate several incinerators." °
Metro also has authority to plan residential subdivisions and large
developments. Metro is required to submit plans for the region to the
Ontario Provincial Government. As soon as these plans are accepted
by the Provincial Government, they become binding and Metro may
enforce them. 201 This authority enables Metro to control urban sprawl.
Rather than allowing municipalities to build huge subdivisions or office
parks at their own discretion, Metro has planned for certain large sub-
urban office developments and has provided the transportation nec-
essary to serve these developments. Metro also has been able to plan
for dense housing and office development in the city of Toronto,2
allowing more people to walk to work or take public transportation.
Although Metro has had problems,2°3 overall it provides and excellent
example of how a regional federation government can succeed in a large
metropolitan area.
(3) The Regional Umbrella Agency
The regional umbrella agency is not so much a government as it
is a planning agency and coordinating body with limited powers to en-
force its regional plan.204 The best example of this type of regional body
198. Id.
199. Id.; see also Make Metro Keep Trash, Pollution Probe Urges, Toronto Globe and Mail,
Dec. 19, 1990, at A7, col. 2 (proposed deal for Metro to ship garbage to an abandoned mine
600 kilometres noith of Toronto over a 20-year period).
200. ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 185, at 11.
201. J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 126.
202. Id.
203. One of the biggest problems facing Metro is that of waste disposal, as it finds outlying
communities increasingly resistant to receiving garbage from Metropolitan Toronto. A LOOK TO
Ta NORTH, supra note 188, ai 41; see also Make Metro Keep Trash, Pollution Probe Urges,
Toronto Globe and Mail, Dec. 19, 1990, at A7, col. 2 (environmental group opposed to proposed
deal to ship Metro garbage to an abandoned mine in northern Ontario).
Another problem Metro faces is increasing costs for welfare, even though the Provincial
Government pays 80% of Metro's welfare costs. Record numbers of welfare cases are being filed
and consequently Metro is facing a budget deficit. Welfare: Quiet Issue but a Big Problem, The
Toronto Star, Sept. 1, 1990, at D4. The problem over which Metro has the least control,
however, is the increasing number of people who live beyond Metro's boundaries, but who are
still very much a part of Toronto's Greater Metropolitan Area. See, The Future of Greater
Metro: Will You Be Living in a Megalopolis of 6 Million or One of Several Satellite Cities?,
The Toronto Star, Oct. 7, 1990, at BI.
204. See J. HoRaN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at xxii; S. ScoT & J. Bou.s, supra note
91, at 14.
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is found in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area (Twin Cities),
which encompasses seven counties and close to 200 municipalities.2
The Minnesota Legislature created a Metropolitan Council (Metro
Council) in 1967.2°6 Like Toronto's Metro government, Metro Council
was not put to a referendum vote.2
Metro Council has three basic functions: to review all metropolitan
plans and projects of municipalities and special districts, and to suspend
any project that it finds not in compliance with its development guide-
lines; to review and comment on any long-term municipal comprehen-
sive plans that will have a substantial effect on metropolitan area
development; and to review applications of local governments for fed-
eral grants, and to reject an application if Metro Council does not ap-
prove of the project.y
The main purpose of Metro Council is to plan for the region and
to oversee other agencies, cities, and counties, which implement actual
operations. 2°9 Examples of agencies that operate under Metro Council
are a waste control commission, a unified transit commission, and an
airport commission. 210 Metro Council does not have the authority to
create any operating agencies; 21' all operating agencies are created by
the Minnesota Legislature.212
Perhaps the most important element of Metro Council's success
is a fiscal disparities law, which reduces competition between munici-
palities for new development. 213 The law requires every municipality to
contribute forty percent of its commercial-industrial tax base growth
since 1971 into a common pool that then is redistributed to every mu-
nicipality in the region according to its population and overall tax base.214
This law enables Metro Council to implement its plan for the region
by avoiding the political fighting of municipalities eager to overdevelop
their communities to increase their tax bases.
Despite its progress, Metro Council has faced some difficulties. For
example, Metro Council did not participate in the battle between
Bloomington, the largest suburb of the Twin Cities, and Minneapolis
205. J. HoRAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 173.
206. Id. at 180; Whiting, Twin Cities Metro Council: Heading for a Fall?, 4 PLANNING 4, 5
(1984).
207. J. HoRAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 177-80.
208. Id. at 182.
209. Id.
210. Whiting, supra note 206, at 5.
211. See J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 184.
212. Id.
213. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 473F.01-.13 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991); see Whiting, supra note
206, at 6-7.
214. Whiting, supra note 206, at 6.
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over which city would build a new stadium.21 5 The Minnesota Legis-
lature bypassed Metro Council and appointed a sports commission to
decide where the new stadium should be located. 21 6 Thus, Metro Council
had no control or input on an important regional issue. More recently,
Metro Council failed to exert any control over Bloomington's plans to
construct the world's largest shopping center. 21 7 Minneapolis Planning
Director Oliver Byrum criticized Metro Council for failing "to look at
the socioeconomic impacts or the long-range impacts on transportation.
It's treating one of the largest development proposals in the area's his-
tory as a question of whether we do or don't need another freeway
interchange.' '218
Byrum believes that a massive shopping center in the suburbs will
undermine the vitality of the two downtowns in the Twin Cities and
is inconsistent with the long-term plans of Metro Council for the re-
gion.219 Exactly why Metro Council was not more involved in the de-
cision to build the Bloomington shopping center is unclear. Although
Metro Council technically has the power to veto large development pro-
jects,m it often appears reluctant to do so.22'
Overall, however, Metro Council is considered successful.m With
the help of the waste control commission, Metro Council established
an efficient sewage network throughout the entire metropolitan area.2
Also, despite some disagreement between Metro Council and its sub-
sidiary transit commission, they have implemented an effective regional
bus system and now are planning construction of a light rail line.24 The
Council also has taken control of selecting sites for dumping the re-
gion's solid waste and sewage.? Like the Miami urban county gov-
ernment and the federation government of Toronto, the regional
umbrella agency of the Twin Cities demonstrates how regional gov-
ernment can succeed.
B. What Type of Regional Government Should the Bay Area Adopt?
After eliminating the supergovernment-which is neither desirable
nor feasible-and the urban county-which though desirable, is not a
215. Id. at 10.
216. Id.
217. See Megamall, a New Fix for Future Shopping Addicts, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1989, at
A14, col. 1.
218. Whiting, supra note 206, at 10.
219. Id.
220. See J. HoRA & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 182.
221. See Whiting, supra note 206, at 9-10.
222. See J. HORAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 193.
223. Id. at 189.
224. Whiting, supra note 206, at 7, 10.
225. Id. at 10.
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realistic possibility for the nine-county Bay Area-two alternatives re-
main: the federation government and the umbrella agency models. The
umbrella agency is easier to establish because it leaves intact many ex-
isting agencies and simply requires the formation of a new agency with
limited powers over the other agencies. An umbrella agency will not
be successful, however, if the number of competing subsidiary agencies
is too large.
The Twin Cities Metro Council is successful because it deals with
one agency for each problem area; there is only one waste control com-
mission, one transportation commission, and one airport commission.
These agencies do not compete against each other since they serve dif-
ferent functions; competition between municipalities is limited due to
the shared tax pool. Yet Metro Council still faces some political fighting
with these agencies as well as with municipalities. 6 In the Bay Area
an umbrella agency could not be successful if it had to deal with twenty-
three transportation districts, 2 7 three major airports,22 and a multitude
of water districts, sewer districts, park districts, and other special pur-
pose agencies.
The California Legislature would have to consolidate the many
different agencies of the Bay Area into a few large agencies for an um-
brella agency to succeed. In addition, legislation would be needed to
form some type of tax-sharing pool, like that of the Twin Cities. The
umbrella agency thus could carry out its plan without municipalities
competing for tax revenues. The necessity of this legislation complicates
its normally relatively simple creation, eliminating the main advantage
of an umbrella agency. The federation government then becomes a more
attractive alternative because it is more powerful and more efficient. 9
The California Legislature should adopt a limited federation re-
gional government for the Bay Area. The new government could be
modeled after Toronto's Metro government, which has been successful
for the most part. 23° Each large special district of the Bay Area, in-
cluding transportation districts, water districts, sewage districts, and
waste disposal districts, would be consolidated into departments of the
226. See id. at 7-10.
227. See supra notes 13, 16.
228. San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose airports.
229. See supra notes 175-225, and accompanying text. An umbrella agency is a planning and
coordinating agency with indirect powers. It must work with other agencies, counties, and
municipalities to see that its policies are met. This indirect power leads to weakness. See supra
notes 217-221 and accompanying text (noting the reluctance of Metro Council to veto large
projects even though doing so arguably is part of its mission). The federation government has
direct power over regional issues. It has the power to implement the projects it plans for the
region, rather than trying to coordinate its plans through independent agencies, counties, and
municipalities.
230. See supra note 188.
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new metropolitan government. All cities and counties in the Bay Area
would retain their autonomy and continue governing matters of local
concern. Since neither the city nor the county status would change, a
popular election would not be required.2'
The new metropolitan government would be responsible for all
matters of regional concern, including water supply, transportation,
sewage and waste disposal, airport and seaport development, Bay con-
servation, and large-scale land use development. The experience in To-
ronto has shown that a regional, federation government on this scale
can work. 2 .
The Bay Area is certainly far more complex now than metropolitan
Toronto was when Metro was formed in 1953. Toronto then was in the
beginning stages of metropolization,233 whereas the Bay Area already
has experienced years of urban growth. Toronto was the central city
and only twelve other municipalities were in the region,23 whereas the
Bay Area has three central cities25 and a total of ninety-eight munic-
ipalities. The Bay Area also has an established, though piecemeal, in-
frastructure, whereas Toronto had the luxury of planning its development
when there was little established infrastructure.
Still, there is a strong need to take regional control of these prob-
lems before they become considerably worse. The Bay Area already has
more than six million people 6 and can be expected to absorb more than
one million more by the year 2000.237 This will require more water, dis-
posal of more sewage and waste, and an extensive overhaul of the re-
gion's public transportation system. A regional entity would tackle most
efficiently these concerns.
Once established, a metropolitan Bay Area government, without
political haggling and delays, immediately could begin planning a trans-
portation system for the unified region. A new tube could be con-
structed under the Bay so that BART could be extended from San
Francisco to Marin County. Simultaneously, BART could be extended
into San Mateo County, not just to San Francisco International Air-
port, but further south to Santa Clara County. 8
231. The California Constitution requires an election for any change in county lines or for
any consolidation or annexation of one city into another. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1(a), 2(b).
The proposed regional government would not require any change in city or county borders.
232, See supra note 188.
233. J. HoRAN & I. TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 111-13.
234. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
235. San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose.
236. See supra note 3.
237. Bay Area Will Grow Despite Itself, San Francisco Chron., May 16, 1989, at Al, col.
1.
238. A single agency in charge of all Bay Area transportation could avoid some of the
BAY AREA REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 1133April 1991]
Another bridge between San Francisco or San Mateo and the East
Bay finally might be built, an idea heavily favored by the Bay Area
public. 239 This bridge could be designed to carry BART trains. Even-
tually, another underwater tube could connect the two airports of San
Francisco and Oakland, so that instead of competing with each other,
they can serve the region's needs as one large unified airport. If and
when the legislature does create such a regional government, however,
it inevitably will confront a legal challenge.
IllI. The Legal Barrier to Creating a Regional Government
The doctrine of "municipal home rule" gives cities in California
the power to govern their own affairs without state interfer-
ence.m Several sections in article eleven of the California Constitution
provide municipal home rule protection for cities and counties.'24 Sec-
tion 5(a) provides in part:
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city gov-
erned thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations
in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limi-
tations provided in their several charters and in respect to other matters
they shall be subject to general laws.242
The section further provides that "[c]ity charters adopted pursuant
to this Constitution ... with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede
all laws inconsistent therewith." 243 Thus, if a regional government in-
terfered with the "municipal affairs" of a city, it would violate the
political controversy over whether to extend BART into San Francisco International Airport or
to build a station a mile away from the airport. See Controversy Revives BART Airport Plan,
San Francisco Chron., Sept. 14, 1990, at A4, col. 1. Currently, airport commissioners and
officials from BART, San Mateo Transit, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and San
Francisco and San Mateo Counties are embroiled in a debate over where to locate the station.
San Mateo officials want the station located a mile away from the airport terminals so that it
can be connected to other forms of transportation in the county. San Francisco and BART
officials, however, fear that people will not take BART to the airport unless the trains go directly
to the terminal. In October 1990, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission began a 16-
month study to examine both alternatives. MTC to Study BART Airport Extension Options,
San Francisco Chron., Oct. 6, 1990, at Cll, col. 3. A single agency in charge would be more
efficient because it would concentrate on what is best for the entire region rather than just a
single county. Furthermore, if a plan for extending BART to Santa Clara County was already
in place, San Mateo County officials might not object to a station in the airport because they
would be assured that the system would be extended down the Peninsula.
239. Bay Area Wants New Bay Bridge, BART Extension, San Francisco Chron., July 19,
1989, at Al, col. 5.
240. B. WrrriN, supra note 23, § 799.
241. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 2-3, 5, 7, 11.
242. Id. § 5(a).
243. Id.
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California Constitution. Also applicable is section seven of article eleven,
which provides that "[a] county or city may make and enforce within
its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations
not in conflict with general laws." ' 2"
To determine whether a city is entitled to home rule protection,
courts examine whether the matter at issue is a "municipal affair" or
a matter of "statewide concern." 24 If the matter is a municipal affair,
city laws will take precedence over state laws. 2" Otherwise, a matter is
considered to be of general interest or state concern, and state laws will
prevail over city laws.? 7 Thus, a regional government violates local home
rule powers when its functions cannot be classified as municipal affairs.
Since the constitution does not define "municipal affair," state courts
have discretion to define the term. Although the cases have not de-
veloped a set formula, the courts have been fairly lenient in finding a
"statewide concern" if the purpose of the law was to address an issue
that is regional in scope.
In City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld,2'- the California Supreme
Court upheld a state "urgency measure" that permitted certain Bay
Area municipalities to sell bonds at a higher rate of interest than ap-
proved by the cities' voters, even though the cities' charters required
that voters approve of the higher interest rate.2 9 In this case Santa Clara
had issued the bonds to finance construction of a regional sewer system.210
The court acknowledged that both sewage control and the issuance of
municipal bonds to finance sewer projects were historically "municipal
affairs," but also noted that "sewer projects may transcend the bound-
aries of one or several municipalities" and "also may affect matters
which are acknowledged to be of statewide concern." 25' The project,
therefore, "'ceases to be a municipal affair and comes within the proper
domain and regulation of the general laws of the state." '252
California courts actually have never addressed the constitution-
ality of a regional government, but in Younger v. County of El Do-
244. Id. § 7. This section was formerly section 11 of article XI of the California Constitution
prior to the 1970 amendment.
245. Bishop v. City of San Jose, I Cal. 3d 56, 61-62, 460 P.2d 137, 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465,
468 (1969).
246. Id.
247. City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld, 3 Cal. 3d 239, 245-46, 474 P.2d 976, 979, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 8, 11 (1970); Bishop, I Cal. 3d at 61-62, 460 P.2d at 140, 81 Ca.Rptr. at 468; B. WrriaN,
supra note 23, §§ 800-804.
248. 3 Cal. 3d 239, 474 P.2d 976, 90 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1970).
249. Id. at 243-45, 474 P.2d at 977-79, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 9-11.
250. Id. at 243, 474 P.2d at 977, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
251. Id. at 246, 474 P.2d at 979-80, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
252. Id. (quoting Wilson v. City of San Bernardino, 186 Cal. App. 2d 603, 611, 9 Cal. Rptr.
431, 436 (1960)).
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rado,23 the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), which essentially is a
regional government.2 4 In that case El Dorado and Placer counties raised
the home rule issue when the state attorney general sought a writ of
mandate commanding the two counties to pay TRPA their share of
TRPA's budget.25 5 To understand the effect of the supreme court's de-
cision, it is essential to discuss the background of the TRPA.
TRPA is a regional agency with jurisdiction over the entire Tahoe
Basin, which in 1971 included two counties in California and three in
Nevada. Located within these five counties were two municipalities, ten
general improvement districts, and several sewer and sanitation dis-
trictsY 6 TRPA is responsible for designing and maintaining a com-
prehensive regional plan for the Tahoe Basin and for adopting ordinances
and regulations setting forth minimum standards that are necessary to
enforce its plan, as long as the regulations are confined to matters that
are regional in nature.2 17 Specific areas over which TRPA has authority
include transportation, land use development, conservation, sewage and
waste disposal, air and lake pollution, recreation, and public service and
facilities.2 18 One of TRPA's primary purposes is to preserve the aesthetic
quality of the Tahoe Basin.2 59 The state law creating TRPA originally
provided that violation of any TRPA regulation was a misdemeanor. 260
TRPA also is given the power to assess each of the five counties for
a portion of its operating expenses. 26 Thus, TRPA is designed to work
in much the same way as the proposed Bay Area federation government.
TRPA itself does not operate any government entities such as a
transit authority or a waste and sewage disposal district. The actual
operations are left to the individual counties and municipalities. 262 In
this way, TRPA differs from the proposed Bay Area regional govern-
ment. This is not a crucial difference, however. Most large-scale services
in the Bay Area, such as water provision, sewage disposal, and trans-
253. 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971).
254. Id. at 501-02, 487 P.2d at 1207, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
255. Id. at 485, 487 P.2d at 1194, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
256. Id. at 493 n.15, 487 P.2d at 1200 n.15, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 560 n.15; see also Note,
Regional Government for Lake Tahoe, 22 HASTINGs L.J. 705, 706 (1971) (authored by Gary J.
Spradling) (general background on the formation and legality of TRPA).
257. Younger, 5 Cal. 3d at 488, 487 P.2d at 1196, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
258. Id., 487 P.2d at 1196-97, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 556-57; Note, supra note 256, at 715.
259. Note, supra note 256, at 719-20.
260. 1967 Cal. Stat. 1589, art. VI, § F (formerly CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66801, art. VI, § F
(West 1968). The law presently states that violation of TRPA regulations is a civil penalty and
will result in a fine. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66801, art. Vi, § 1 (West Supp. 1991).
261. Id. at 489, 487 P.2d at 1197, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
262. Note, supra note 256, at 719.
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portation, are provided by the counties or by large agencies such as
BART, AC Transit, and the East Bay Municipal Utilities District. Thus,
if a Bay Area government took over these services, it would affect the
large agencies and counties, but not cities. Although certain agencies
may not like abdicating their power, they are not protected by municipal
home rule, unlike cities and counties. 6
Furthermore, it is unlikely that a county would stage a municipal
home rule challenge because of the obvious regional nature of providing
these large-scale services. These large-scale services are matters of state
concern, not municipal affairs. Municipal home rule becomes more sig-
nificant when the regional government dictates what actions cities and
counties must take, such as imposing land-use restrictions or mandatory
recycling.
TRPA is similar to the proposed Bay Area regional government
because it has authority over the counties and municipalities in its re-
gion. It can block construction of a large-scale project that a city may
want to build.2 For example, if Stateline, Nevada, wants to build more
large casinos to increase tourism, TRPA can veto such a plan.265 A Bay
Area federation government could have the same type of authority to
block large developments that do not conform with a Bay Area de-
velopment plan. In one sense, TRPA's authority is even greater because
it can prevent construction of a single casino building that would alter
the aesthetic quality of the region. The proposed Bay Area government
would not have the power to block construction for aesthetic purposes.
Only projects having a regional impact could be affected; one building
is not likely to have such an effect.2
In Younger v. County of El Dorado,267 the California Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of TRPA because it found that the
agency was clearly regional in scope. The court found:
The water that the Agency is to purify cannot be confined within one
county or state; it circulates freely throughout Lake Tahoe. The air
which the Agency must preserve from pollution knows no political
boundaries. The wildlife which the Agency should protect ranges freely
from one local jurisdiction to another. Nor can the population and
263. Article XI of the California Constitution does not provide any degree of protection for
legislatively created agencies.
264. Note, supra note 256, at 719-20.
265. Troubles at Tahoe: Water, Air and Traffic, L.A. Times, May 12, 1985, pt. 4, at 3, col.
4 (TRPA actually has denied permission to build additional casinos).
266. If one building were the size of Bishop Ranch or Hacienda Business Park in the San
Ramon Valley, each of which contains millions of feet of office space and tens of thousands of
employees, then that building certainly would have a regional impact. See supra notes 118-125
and accompanying text.'
267. 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971).
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explosive development which threaten the region be contained by any
of the local authorities which govern parts of Tahoe Basin. Only an
agency transcending local boundaries can devise, adopt and put into
operation solutions for the problems besetting the region as a whole.26
The court also noted that when deciding whether a government
function is a municipal affair, the court gives great weight to the de-
clared purpose of the legislature. 269 From the clear language of the stat-
ute creating TRPA, as well as from the general ecological situation in
the Tahoe Basin, the court had no difficulty finding that TRPA served
a regional purpose and therefore did not violate any home rule pro-
visions of the California Constitution. 270
The court considered it important that the enabling statute left to
local jurisdictions all local matters, including the ability to enact their
own ordinances, regulations, and policies as long as they conformed
to the regional plan.27' Although zoning and planning traditionally have
been considered exclusively local matters,2 72 the court was not deterred.
First, it pointed out that only regional zoning and planning were under
the purview of TRPA, not local zoning and planning.2 73 Regional zoning
and planning indisputably are not "local in nature and purpose."2 74
Second, the court noted that 'municipal affairs' is not a static con-
cept; .'[i]t changes with the changing conditions upon which it is to
operate."' 2 7 Thus, planning and zoning, which at one time may have
been municipal affairs2 76 have become regional affairs because of the
changed circumstances in the Tahoe Basin.
The same rationale would apply to the Bay Area. Although zoning
traditionally has been a municipal affair, 277 when cities begin zoning for
large office parks and subdivisions in an already crowded metropolitan
area, there is an obvious regional effect. As long as a regional gov-
ernment does not interfere with local government authority to govern
local affairs, which would include small-scale zoning, it is unlikely that
a court would find a home rule violation.
268. Id. at 493-94, 487 P.2d at 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
269. Id. at 493, 487 P.2d at 1200, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 560; see also Bishop v. City of San Jose,
1 Cal. 3d. 56, 63, 460 P.2d 137, 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 469 (1969) (recognizing that courts will
give great weight to legislative purpose when deciding whether a matter is a municipal affair).
270. Younger, 5 Cal. 3d at 497, 487 P.2d at 1203, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
271. Id.
272. B. Wrr, N, supra note 23, § 826; Note, Land-Use Control, Externalities, and the
Municipal Affairs Doctrine: A Border Conflict, 8 Loy. L.A.L. R~v. 432, 447-51 (1975) (authored
by David R. McEwen).
273. Younger, 5 Cal. 3d at 497, 487 P.2d at 1203-04, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 563-64.
274. Id., 487 P.2d at 1204, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
275. Id. at 498, 487 P.2d at 1204, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 564 (quoting Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
City & County of S.F., 51 Cal. 2d 766, 771, 336 P.2d 514 (1959)).
276. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
277. Id.
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In Creed v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission,278
for example, the California Court of Appeals confronted a challenge
to the constitutionality of the Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972.279
This Act created regional coastal commissions that had authority over
any development along the California coastline. The Act required any
developer who wanted to build within the coastal region to obtain a
permit from a regional commission. 2 Before issuing a permit, the com-
mission had to determine that the proposed development would not
have an adverse environmental or ecological effect, and the applicant
had the burden of proof to make this showing.2 ' The suit was brought
to test the constitutionality of the Act and did not arise out of any
factual circumstances. 2 One of the contentions was that the Act in-
terfered with the municipal affairs of chartered cities, in violation of
article eleven, section 5(a) of the California Constitution.m
The court acknowledged that zoning, planning, and issuance of
permits for land development were areas in which chartered cities tra-
ditionally had plenary power. Under these circumstances, however, the
court held they were clearly a matter of statewide concern, reasoning
that "it can be safely said that where the activity, whether municipal
or private, is one which can affect persons outside the city, the state
is empowered to 'prohibit or regulate the externalities." '2" Although
in this case protecting the coastal zone was considered a matter of state
concern rather than of regional concern, the court compared this state
interest to the regional interest found in Younger, and relied on Younger
to reach its decision.m
There seems to be little doubt that courts would uphold a limited
regional government in the Bay Area as long as it did not interfere with
matters of truly local concern. Affairs such as operating police and fire
departments, operating libraries, implementing small-scale zoning, is-
suing liquor licenses, maintaining streets and city parks, issuing mu-
nicipal bonds for capital improvements, and running local elections are
matters that could be left to municipalities. Counties could continue to
operate the court system, the district attorney's office, and the sheriff's
278. 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974).
279. This Act, otherwise known as Proposition 20, was passed by California voters in the
November 7, 1972 general election. Id. at 311, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 319; CAL. PuB. R.s. CODE §§
27000-27650 (West 1972), repealed by California Coastal Act of 1976, ch. 1330, §1 (codified at
CAL. PuB. R.s. CODE §§ 30000-30900)(West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
280. Creed, 43 Cal. App. 3d at 311-12, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
281. Id. at 312, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
282. Id., 118 Cal. Rptr. at 318-319.
283. Id. at 320, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
284. Idi. at 321, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (quoting Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in California, 60
CALir. L. Rv. 1055, 1085, (1972)).
285. Id. at 322, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
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department. Truly regional affairs, however, including transportation,
regional land use planning, water supply, and waste disposal, could be
transferred over to a new regional government that then could combine
planning and operations.
Conclusion
Fortunately, the members of Bay Vision 2020 are recommending
that a temporary form of regional government be created to address
the increasing urban problems facing the Bay Area until a more per-
manent plan can be imposed.2U 6 Although it is too early to judge, the
political response to such a recommendation is likely to be negative. 2"
As one Bay Area politician explained, "[ilt's a risky thing, endorsing
regional government." Unfortunately, an all too common attitude of
politicians in the Bay Area is "change is necessary, but not in my elec-
tion year." 289
It is inevitable that at some point there no longer will be any choice
in the matter. As the population of the Bay Area continues to grow,
the need for a regional government becomes more apparent. When the
gridlock on area highways doubles in the next five years2m and when
public transportation has not improved by any appreciable degree, peo-
ple will begin to demand change. The Bay Conservation and Devel-
opment Commission will realize that its efforts to conserve the Bay are
useless, because courts continue to give Bay Area cities permission to
dump less-than-fully-treated sewage into the Bay. 291 The drought no
longer will be unusual. Water rationing will be a way of life. 292
286. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
287. The Main County supervisors initially voted to refuse to back Bay Vision 2020's
proposed regional agency. Supervisors Oppose Regional Agency, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 13,
1991, at B6, col. 1. After reconsideration, however, Main supervisors decided they wanted to
be included in Bay Area planning efforts and voted to back most of the Bay Vision 2020 findings.
Marin Board Backs Bay Superagency Plan, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 20, 1991, at B7, col. 2;
see also Proposal for 9-County Agency Faces Lots of Local Squabbling, San Francisco Chron.,
Feb. 21, 1991, at A6, col. 4 (initial reaction by Bay Area Counties and agencies to Bay Vision
2020 draft proposal is lukewarm).
288. Bay Area 'Turf Wars' Stymie Regional Planning, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 9, 1989,
at Al, col. 2 (quoting Contra Costa County Supervisor Tom Powers, one of the few Bay Area
politicians who has endorsed regional government).
289. Id. at 4 (Revan Tranter, executive director of the Association of Bay Area Governments,
noting that this response is the private concession of local officials).
290. See Sweeping Plan to Solve Bay Traffic Mess, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 15, 1990, at
A4, col. 1.
291. See supra note 140.
292. For most Bay Area residents, rationing is already a way of life as the drought continues
into its fifth year. See Wilson Orders Water Reduced For All, San Francisco Examiner, Feb.
15, 1991, at Al, col.l.
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California legislators need to look beyond the negative image of
regional government as another layer of bureaucracy that will usurp
power for local government. Leaders should realize that the municipal
government system designed by the 1879 California Constitution no
longer can address adequately the problems facing the metropolitan ar-
eas of modem times. A regional government is the only hope the Bay
Area has of addressing these problems, and it must be created now.

